Workshop on “Thick Concepts in the Philosophy of Science”
E-Mail Adresse für Einreichungen: email@example.com
Call-Bezeichnung: Call for Papers
Ende: 04.12.2021 --:--
Veranstaltende Institution: Institute of Philosophy
Philosophical analyses of thick ethical concepts have usually focussed on virtue and vice terms. These concepts seem to undermine the traditional fact/value-dichotomy and thus, to provide a further challenge to the value-free ideal of science. Accordingly, attention has been drawn to many scientific concepts, such as well-being, risk and safety, addiction, GDP and unemployment.
While these concepts may not easily fit into the traditional category of thick ethical concepts, they raise interesting questions to the philosophy of science, for example:
• Do thick concepts threaten the ideal of value-free science?
• What are the epistemological consequences of using thick concepts in science?
• How can scientific claims containing thick concepts be objective?
• What methodological requirements can be discerned to the study of thick concepts?
• How should concepts that are thick in everyday language be operationalized in science?
• How can scientist give good scientific advice on issues involving thick concepts?
The 1.5-day-workshop aims at providing a forum for intense discussion on the role and value of thick concepts in the philosophy of science. It will consist of presentations by participants, and a workshop section that synthesizes the findings and discusses future avenues of development.
We invite researchers to present their work-in-progress in a 30-min presentation. Please send an abstract of up to 300 words, suitable for blind review.