Normative Powers in Law and Morality
E-Mail Adresse für Einreichungen: email@example.com
Call-Bezeichnung: Call for Papers
Ort: University of Oxford
Uhrzeit: 09:15 Uhr
Ende: 04.07.2019 18:00
Veranstaltende Institution: University of Oxford
People can change the moral and legal status of certain acts by communicating their intention to do so, e.g. by consenting or promising. This ability is often referred to as an individual’s normative power and is highly significant in both law and morality.
Given the relevance of normative powers in both law and morality, it is specifically an interdisciplinary discourse that could facilitate substantial progress, in particular on the following questions: are the reasons why individuals have or should have normative powers different in law and morality? If so, why? To what extent does the range of things which people can promise and consent to differ between the legal and moral context? How are legal changes in the status of an act different from moral changes in the status of an act? And if there are differences, why do they exist? Do the law and morality take a different stance on the question of what kinds of influence and circumstances (e.g. coercion, deception, mistake, power differentials) vitiate consent or invalidate a promise? Does the law’s binary assumption that consent and promises are either valid or invalid (but nothing in between) reflect an essential feature of normative powers, or is it just a useful fiction for the purposes of the law?
We invite PhD students, recent graduates, and postdoctoral researchers without a permanent position submit an abstract (max. 600 words) and apply for the remaining presentation slots available during this conference.
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