Epistemic Dilemmas, Normative Conflicts, and Epistemic Normativity

We're happy to announce the second workshop of the research project Epistemic Dilemmas, Normative Conflicts, and Epistemic Normativity, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The workshop will focus on epistemic normativity, epistemic reasons, and epistemic dilemmas.

 

We're happy to make online attendance possible to registered participants upon request.

Topics:

-       What is epistemic rationality?

-       Is there a unified concept of epistemic rationality?

-       Or do we need to bifurcate epistemic rationality into a structural and a substantive dimension? What are the benefits of conceiving epistemic rationality as so bifurcated?

-       Can there be instances of rational epistemic akrasia?

-       What are epistemic reasons? Are they genuinely normative?

-       What is the relation between the epistemic and the practical domains? Does the practical encroach on the epistemic?

-       How do practical considerations affect ideal epistemology?

-       Can there be practical reasons for belief?

-       What is higher-order evidence? Is it even evidence?

-       How should we deal with (apparent) epistemic dilemmas, for examples dilemmas involving higher-order evidence?

-       What is the nature of suspension? Is suspension sensitive to higher-order evidence? 

Attendance:

Attendance is free, but registration is required. Please register by email at epistemicnorms@gmail.com. The deadline for registration is August 15, 2024.

Organizing committee:

Martin Grajner (TU Dortmund): martin.grajner@tu-dortmund.de

Eva Schmidt (TU Dortmund): eva.schmidt@tu-dortmund.de

Further Information:

https://epistemicdilemmas.weebly.com/workshops